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PROPERTY RIGHTS IN OUTER SPACE
KURT ANDERSON BACA*
D URING the past thirty years, Man took his first steps
toward freeing himself from the confines of his birth-
place, Earth. The advanced, industrialized nations of the
world visited the Moon, probed the planets, and estab-
lished a continuous scientific, commercial, and military'
presence in the orbits of the earth. Planned activities for
the future include a permanently manned multinational
earth orbiting space station2 and renewed manned plane-
* Associate at Gallop, Johnson & Neuman, St Louis, Missouri. Prepared while
a student at the Georgetown University Law Center.
In its preamble, the principal treaty governing outer space suggests that outer
space be used for peaceful purposes. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activi-
ties of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610
U.N.T.S. 205 (entered into force with respect to the United States on Oct. 10,
1967) [hereinafter Outer Space Treaty]. However, in its substantive sections, the
Outer Space Treaty prohibits only the placement of weapons of mass destruction
in earth orbit. Id. at art. IV, para. 1. It has not been construed to include military
reconnaissance, communications or navigation satellites. It probably does not in-
clude conventional weapon systems not deemed to be capable of mass destruc-
tion. "While some countries wished the treaty to be more comprehensive, the
U.S.S.R. and the United States, which had submitted draft treaties leading to the
agreed text, were not willing to go beyond what was finally agreed." Nandasiri
Jasentuliyana and N.R. Chipman, The UN and Space Weapons 7 [No. 4] Harvard
International Review 32 (Jan./Feb. 1985).
2 "[T]he United States, Canada, Japan, and the nine member states of the Euro-
pean Space Agency (ESA), [which includes the Kingdom of Belgium, the King-
dom of Denmark, the French Republic, the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Italian Republic, the Kingdom of the Netherlands, the Kingdom of Norway, the
Kingdom of Spain, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land] became partners in an intergovernmental venture to launch a permanently
inhabited civil space station." Mary B. McCord, Note, Responding to the Space Sta-
tion Agreement: The Extension of U.S. Law into Space, 77 GEO. L.J. 1933, 1933-34
(1989) (citing Agreement on Cooperation in the Detailed Design, Development,
Operation, and Utilization of the Permanently Manned Civil Space Station, done
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tary exploration.' Official groups have further recom-
mended more intense development of space resources,
including "large-scale mineral recovery activities in
space.
' 4
Celestial bodies, including the Moon and certain Earth-
approaching asteroids, which may be accessible for ex-
ploitation in the near future, are rich in materials that
would be useful for a variety of purposes on Earth and in
outer space. Within decades,5 man could be able to util-
ize the resources of the Moon to support space explora-
tion, manufacturing in space of items for use on Earth,
and in the industrialization of the Moon and the orbits of
the Earth. A congressional committee, in assessing the
space resources that could be covered by the Moon
Sept. 29, 1988, and Arrangement Concerning Application of the Space Station
Agreement Pending Its Entry into Force, done Sept. 29, 1988); President Reagan's
State of the Union Address, 20 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 87, 90 (Jan. 25, 1984)
(calling for development of permanent manned space station for scientific, com-
mercial and industrial use).
I National Aeronautics and Space Administration Authorization Act, Fiscal
Year 1991, Pub. L. No. 101-611, 104 Stat. 3190 (1990). Section 102(15) states
that it is to be the policy of the United States to "seek innovative technologies that
will make possible advanced human exploration initiatives, such as the establish-
ment of a lunar base and the succeeding mission to Mars." Section 103(a)(1)(E)
authorizes $337,200,000 in Fiscal Year 1991 for use in research and development
for planetary exploration. This was a compromise between the Senate and a more
expansive House authorization. See NASA Multiyear Authorization Act of 1990,
H.R. 5649, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990) (calling for authorization of $444 million
in Fiscal Year 1992, $649 million in Fiscal Year 1993 for the human exploration
initiative, the goals of which are to establish a permanent base on the moon and
travel to Mars); see also David C. Morrison, NAT'LJ., Aug. 19, 1989, at 2117 (Presi-
dent Bush calls for return to Moon and manned mission to Mars).
4 Grier C. Raclin, From Ice to Ether: The Adoption of a Regime to Govern Resource
Exploitation in Outer Space, 7 Nw. J. INrr'L L. & Bus. 727, 728-29 (1986) (United
States National Commission on Space "recommended that steps necessary to un-
dertake the development of . . . extraterrestrial resources begin at once" and
"called for the establishment of pilot mining and production facilities on the
Moon by the year 2007"). See also Fred Kosmo, Note, The Commercialization of Space:
A Regulatory Scheme that Promotes Commercial Ventures and International Responsibility, 61
S. CAL. L. REV. 1055, 1056 (1988) (discussing intensifying commercialization of
space and the feasibility of mining celestial bodies).
5 STAFF OF SENATE COMMITrEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION,
96TH CONG., 2D SESS., AGREEMENT GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF STATES ON THE
MOON AND OTHER CELESTIAL BODIES, Part 4, 417 (Comm. Print 1980) ("space
manufacturing based on lunar material utilization could conceivably be decades
away") [hereinafter MOON TREATY REPORT].
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Treaty6 stated, in part, that
Lunar surface materials are a possible future source of raw
material which could be processed in space to produce
structural metals, oxygen, silicon, glass, and ceramic prod-
ucts. Lunar metals have potential for construction pur-
poses. Titanium, a strong light metal which can withstand
high temperatures, is in much demand for the aerospace
industry today and may have a number of uses in space
construction. Processing lunar titanium may be easier
(and possibly cheaper) than processing Earth titanium, for
titanium processing requires high temperatures, a vac-
uum, and large quantities of energy. Lunar silicon could
be used to build photovoltaic systems in orbit or on the
Moon. The oxygen from lunar materials could be com-
bined with hydrogen from the earth to make water and
could also be used in making an atmosphere for workers
in space.7
The report goes on to state that "most of the require-
ments for human activity and industry in space except
water and hydrogen, are available at the lunar surface. ' '8
The Earth-approaching asteroids are also potential
sources of useful materials, including water, and the ex-
ploitation of the resources of Earth-approaching asteroids
may be even more attractive than those of the Moon for
the provision of materials for space manufacturing. 9
6 Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celes-
tial Bodies, G.A. Res. 34/68, 34 U.N. GAOR, 34th Sess., Supp. No. 46, at 77, U.N.
Doc. A/34/664 (1979) [hereinafter Moon Treaty].
7 MOON TREATY REPORT, supra note 5, at 415. Currently, interest is focused on
the presence of Helium 3 on the Moon's surface (as a product of solar radiation
bombardment), a substance not found on Earth but valuable in fusion energy gen-
eration schemes.
8 Id. at 416.
9 Id. at 417-18 ("economics of asteroidal retrieval may be more favorable than
lunar resource retrieval by about an order of magnitude due to additional require-
ments imposed on lunar materials retrieval"). See John Davies, Mission to the Aster-
oids, NEW SCIENTIST, Nov. 17, 1983, at 490 (earth orbit crossing asteroids "may
represent a future source of raw materials"); Lewis and Mainel, Asteroid Mining and
Space Bunkers, DEFENSE SCIENTIST, June 1983, at 33 (1000-2000 near earth aster-
oids with diameters greater than 100 meters; ten percent "energetically more ac-
cessible than the surface of the Moon"). Asteroids located in the belt between
Mars and Jupiter are also thought to be potentially useful. They are "thought to
contain a rich variety of materials in sufficient quantities to 'support a civilization
1993] 1043
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Several reasons are advanced for the exploitation of
these resources.' 0 First, and probably most immediate,
would be to realize the cost savings inherent in the use of
materials from space in the manufacture of products
whose use will also be in space. The cost of lifting similar
materials from Earth could be reduced by obtaining the
materials directly from the Moon or the asteroids. The
amount of energy required to lift a given mass from the
Moon into space is one-twentieth of that required to lift
the mass from the Earth. The energy required to lift the
mass from an asteroid is even lower." Second, there are a
group of related factors. The raw materials from space
could serve as an alternative source of those materials that
have, or may become, depleted on Earth, or whose price
has become economically, politically, or environmentally
too high. These factors are often interrelated. Thus,
while there is little likelihood of the immediate depletion
of any particular raw material on Earth, accessible
reserves of a nation may become depleted requiring use
of a lower grade source of the material or a substitute.
This could result in higher direct costs to obtain the mate-
rial and higher environmental costs in mining or process-
ing the material. 12 The depletion of reserves could also
many thousand times larger than the Earth's population.'" Raclin, supra note 4,
at 728 (citing NAT'L COMM'N ON SPACE, PIONEERING THE SPACE FRONTIER 3, at 88
(1986)).
,0 Some authors are quite emphatic. "The development of space resources is
not being pursued simply for the sake of accomplishment nor is it merely a full-
employment program for the world's scientists. Rather, an immediate and genu-
ine need exists for finding alternative sources to replace the natural resources
currently found on earth." Douglas A. Barritt, Note, A "Reasonable" Approach to
Resource Development in Outer Space, 12 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 615, 618
(1990). Others more restrained. "There may be significant economic, environ-
mental, and political incentives for utilization and exploitation of extraterrestrial
resources." MOON TREATY REPORT, supra note 5, at 418.
" MOON TREATY REPORT, supra note 5, at 418-19. Of course a complete eco-
nomic analysis would also require figuring the cost of mining the materials on the
Moon or an asteroid. Thus, the savings in lifting the material may not all be real-
ized when the added costs in space are included. However, a further savings may
be realized by utilizing raw materials from space and avoiding the lift from earth
by internalizing the environmental costs of pollutants discharged in the lifting of
the materials from Earth. See id. at 419.
12 The Moon Treaty Report gives the example of iron ores to illustrate.
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lead to increasing political tension with third world pro-
ducers of raw materials and perhaps lead those states to
attempt to exact an unacceptable political price from the
industrialized states. 3
Eventually, it seems, the development and exploitation
of space resources will become necessary. It has been
suggested that "[t]he quality of America's future social
and economic welfare is inextricably intertwined with the
successful commercialization of space by American pri-
vate enterprise."'" The costs of exploiting space re-
sources will, however, be quite high. While there are "no
insurmountable technical problems which should pre-
vent" such exploitation,' 5 the risks undertaken by any
government or commercial enterprise endeavoring to use
space resources are very great. The risks include the pos-
sibility of technical problems as well as all of the risks that
usually face a new enterprise.' 6 In addition, the potential
enterprise must contend with the uncertain state of the
law in outer space, which makes the status of its interests
in space uncertain, even if that interest should prove to be
profitable. "It would seem equally clear that, without law
in this area, no country, government, or commercial en-
terprise is likely to undertake the substantial risks and
"[T]hough the Earth has plentiful iron reserves, the reserves of easily accessible
or high-grade deposits which can be exploited at low environmental and financial
cost are decreasing." MOON TREATY REPORT, supra note 5, at 419. Another exam-
ple may be the diminishing supply of energy resource reserves. The use of coal or
nuclear fuels as a substitute for oil and natural gas poses financial and environ-
mental costs (as well as political costs to obtain the existing oil from those states
which have large reserves). Barritt, supra note 10, at 618-22. Space solar satellites
could alleviate the energy problem as could space sources of radioactive materials
and space dumping of used radioactive materials. See MOON TREATY REPORT,
supra note 5, at 420.
S MOON TREATY REPORT, supra note 5, at 419; Barritt, supra note 10, at 619.
14 Kosmo, supra note 4, at 1056.
'5 MOON TREATY REPORT, supra note 5, at 419-20.
16 In the extraction of natural resources the risk of a 'dry hole' is always great.
Furthermore, any resource extraction enterprise must still compete with Earth
sources, subjecting that enterprise to the possibility of new competitors or uncer-
tain price competition from existing producers. In manufacturing, the risks asso-
ciated with untried processes or operations with high initial capital costs are also
great.
1993] 1045
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costs involved in such exploitation."' 7
What is needed is certainty in the law. Furthermore, if
space is to be successfully commercialized by "American
private enterprise," the law should be compatible with
such a system. The successful development of space re-
sources requires meaningful property rights, allocation of
those rights and recourse to some power for the enforce-
ment of those rights. To date, the allocation of rights to
geostationary orbit positions provides the only precedent
in space that is even remotely analogous to the situation
that might be faced in the exploitation of other space re-
sources. The purpose of this note will be to evaluate the
adequacy of the developing law of property in space as
reflected in treaties, custom, and practice in the allocation
of geostationary orbit positions. To the extent that this
body of law is inadequate, this note suggests neessary
remedies. These remedies provide a suggested viewpoint
and process for the development of property law rather
than specific formulations of legal rights and remedies.
Part I of the note considers the role of property rights
in the development of earthly resources. This will in-
cludes a discussion of certain essential property rights for
efficient utilization of resources and a discussion of the
problem of equitable allocation of those rights. Part II of
the note examines the current status of space law and
property. Treaties and customary law in space relating to
property are first evaluated. Next, the developing 'law'
relating to the allocation of geostationary orbit positions
is discussed. Included in this section will be a discussion
of the geostationary orbit, its importance and the institu-
tions and processes regulating its use. Finally, Part II
concludes with an evaluation of the adequacy of the ex-
isting space law, including the law on allocation of geosta-
tionary orbit, for the efficient and equitable development
of space resources. Part III presents an alternative ap-
proach to resource allocation in space-including a listing
11 Raclin, supra note 4, at 730.
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of the necessary property rights, allocation of those
rights, and, most importantly, the guaranteeing of those
rights. A recommendation that the issue of sovereignty
be reconsidered in space, as some form of sovereignty is
an absolute necessity to the guarantee of the property
rights required for the development of space resources, is
advanced. Finally, Part III concludes with the suggestion
that the course of man's history is continuous and, regard-
less of high-minded sentiments, the extension of that his-
tory into space is inevitable.
I. PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE DEVELOPMENT
OF RESOURCES
This part of the note first examines the fundamental
rights associated with a property interest. A "fundamen-
tal right" in this context is a right whose existence is nec-
essary for the equitable and efficient utilization of
resources. Along with the examination of fundamental
rights, the critical issue of the initial allocation of property
interests is considered in the first section of this part.'"
The second section of this part examines whether the
HI See infra part I.A. This examination, it must be admitted, takes a decidedly
Anglo-American view of property. It is beyond the scope of this paper to justify
this position; however, particularly at this point in the history of man's unfortu-
nate flirtation with ideology, it should be obvious to the intelligent observer of the
political and economic condition of Eastern Europeans (and of many developing
nations in other regions) that the utopian promises of the philosophers of the late
18th and 19th centuries and their revolutionary followers were pernicious in real-
ity. The political tyranny and economic ruin that accompany the quest for utopian
ends is manifest in the history of the twentieth century. The strength of Anglo-
American property law is its pragmatic reliance on the experience of man, rather
than on his abstract rationalism or romantic fantasies, and its development
through the thoughtful resolution of ripened problems-those with real, rather
than merely postulated or anticipated contexts. See discussion infra part III.
This is not to say that Anglo-American institutions are necessarily required for
the establishment of these rights. Indeed, where civil law traditions recognize
analogous rights societies flourish. Again, it is beyond the scope of this paper to
justify this assertion. It really appears obvious. Even critics of the West seem not
to deny the superiority of the rights and advantages of Western societies so much
as they argue that things might be so much better. This perhaps may be the case,
but the history of revolutions has indicated that things may certainly be much
worse. So much worse that ideological civilization is more likely to represent an
oxymoron than any tolerable arrangement for human society. See infra notes 62-
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rights and principles of property necessary for resource
development on Earth will be needed for the equitable
and efficient development of the resources of outer space.
A. PROPERTY LAW AND ALLOCATION
1. Property Powers, Social Efficiency, and the Role of the
Sovereign
It is fundamental in property law that property rights
are defined, not against the thing that is the subject of the
property law, but against the rest of the world. 9 The use
of traditional Hohfeldian relationships illustrates the
sense of this proposition. 20 A right supposes a correlative
duty.2 ' Thus the establishment by legislatures or courts
of rights against a thing would be pointless since it is use-
less to establish the correlative duty in the thing to the
one who possesses the right. No degree of exertion by
the state is likely to result in a submission by the thing to
any laws other than those of physics. The state can, how-
ever, enforce the duties it imposes on citizens. 2 The law
of property is regulation of the behavior of persons rela-
tive to one another with respect to the various things that
persons may possess. Indeed, if property is recognized as
the rights of persons vis-a'-vis other persons rather than
66 and accompanying text (discussing the relevance of the preceding observations
as they relate to a legal regime for resource utilization in space).
19 Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 1221, 1221
(1979). "The system itself presupposes that there are rights over given things
that are vested in certain individuals within that system. And the system knows
full well that these property rights in things are defined not against the thing, but
over the thing and against the rest of the world." "Property rights are, of course,
a species of relationships between people." Alex Kozinski, Introduction: Of Profli-
gacy, Piracy, and Private Property, 13 HARV. J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 17, 19 (1990).
20 See Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial
Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16, 228-59 (1913) (discussing fundamental legal relations
and correlations between rights and duties).
21 Id. at 31.
22 This discussion will also suggest the pointlessness of creating rights in per-
sons (individual or corporate) or in states when the body creating that right has no
power-or duty-to ensure adherence to the correlative duty by a meaningful
community. See infra note 182 and accompanying text (discussing the necessity of
a sovereign power to a functioning system of property rights).
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things, it is easy to see that property cannot exist without
law.2 3
The rights of property normally confer three powers24
on the holder of these rights: the power to exclude others
from the property or to exclusive possession; the power to
use the property; and the power to transfer the property
to another of his choosing at the time of his choosing (the
power of disposition). 25 Professor Epstein neatly summa-
rizes the economic justification for the inclusion of each of
these rights in an efficient system of property.26 The
power to exclude is the starting point that makes the pos-
23 This idea is expressed in the works of the great political philosophers. For
example, Locke, while suggesting the possibility of property before the existence
of the state as a matter of natural law, admits that the state is necessary to the
existence of property rights. JOHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, SEC-
OND TREATISE 390, 123 (Peter Laslett ed., student ed. 1988) (3d ed. 1698).
"Why will he . . . subject himself to the Dominion and Controul of any other
Power? To which 'tis obvious to Answer, that though in the state of Nature he
hath such a right, yet the Enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly ex-
posed to the Invasion of others.... And 'tis not without reason, that he seeks out,
and is willing tojoyn in Society with others who are already united, or have a mind
to unite for the mutual Preservation of their Lives, Liberties, and Estates, which I
call by the general Name, Property." Id. And, Rousseau asserts that in the social
contract (that is, the state), man "acquires civil liberty and the proprietorship of
all he possesses." JEAN Rouss.Au, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 19 (Charles Frankel ed.
1947) (based on anonymous translation published in 1991). "Property and law
are born together, and die together. Before laws were made there was not prop-
erty; take away laws, and property ceases." JEREMY BENTHAM, THEORY OF LEGISLA-
TION: PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL CODE 113 (C.K. Ogden ed. & Richard Hildreth
trans. 1931).
This notion is also reflected in judicial decisions. For example, Justice Jackson
stated "only those economic advantages are 'rights' which have the law back of
them . . . whether it is a property right is really the question to be answered."
United States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499, 502-03 (1945).
24 Using the Hohfeldian terminology, the grant of a power creates a correlative
liability in other parties to that power. Hohfeld, supra note 20, at 44. Thus if A
has the power to exclude B from his property, B is liable to the power of A and
may be excluded. See id. It follows that, if A exercises the power as a right, the
grantor of the right has the duty to uphold that right by giving effect to the power.
25 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROPERTY § 1 (1936); Richard A. Epstein, Property
and Necessity, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 2, 3 (1990) (citing 12 OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY 639 (2d ed. 1989)). See GEORGE W. HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT 46,
53 (T.M. Knox trans., 1949) (presenting an analogous relation of the 'will' to the
'thing' in property consisting of taking possession, use, and alienation). See also
infra notes 42-59 and accompanying text (discussing manner of obtaining prop-
erty right in the first instance and the equity of such arrangements).
26 Epstein, Property and Necessity, supra note 25, at 3-4.
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sessor the arbiter of access to property. This power is
negative in effect, giving the holder of the property secur-
ity against others but not in itself giving the holder posi-
tive powers with respect to the property. It is enabling,
nevertheless, in the sense of securing the holder's expec-
tations in the property should he be given power to affect
positive developments or dispositions of the property.
Exclusivity secures the fruits of the positive powers. By so
doing, this negative power encourages the holder of the
property rights to take action and to invest time and
resources in the property as allowed by the positive
powers.28
As Professor Epstein points out, however, "[i]f we
stopped with possession ...[t]he world would remain a
tundra, in which [the holder of the right] could keep [his]
own place on the barren square of the checkerboard. '29
The property holder must also have the power to use the
property.3 0 From this power arises production. Produc-
tion serves the needs of the owner and, in many instances,
will result in a surplus that benefits society.3 '
The final positive power inherent in an efficient system
of property rights is the power to dispose of the property
as desired. By this power, properties may be exchanged
in a way that allows holders of property to maximize their
utility in the property.3 2 By maximizing in some measure
27 Id. at 3.
28 Thus the holder is allowed to enjoy the benefits of his other rights. Locke
argued that the securing of this benefit, that is, protecting the holder of the right
against the "invasion of others," was the end (that is, purpose) of civil society and
government. Locke, supra note 23, at 350.
2 Epstein, Property and Necessity, supra note 25, at 3.
30 It has been argued by political philosophers that the justification for posses-
sion, that is, the power to exclude, is found in productive use. "As much land as a
Man Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates, and can use the Product of, so much is his
Property." LoCKE, supra note 23, at 290.
S See infra note 53 (quoting Locke on the societal benefit of surplus
production).
12 See Epstein, Property and Necessity, supra note 25, at 4-5. The measure of utility
being at the discretion of each party. Regardless of the measure used, the utility
of each may be related to increasing the level of well-being (in some way) for each
party. This assumes that the exchange was made in the familiar 'arms-length
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social satisfaction, this three power system may be said to
be efficient. Taken altogether, the property system con-
sisting of these three powers would
necessarily have a self-generating capacity with each suc-
cessive exchange or transfer. These private, decentral-
ized, voluntary transactions, enforced by a ... state, would
generate more by way of gains than it would produce by
way of losses. Through repetitive interaction, [society]
would move to higher and higher levels of social
33satisfaction....
The common law reflects each of these powers.3 4 The
power to exclude is reflected in the common law of tres-
pass. 35 The power to use is reflected in the common law
of nuisance, which "is essentially the common-law re-
sponse against strangers who interfere with the use of
property. ' 36 Finally, the power of disposition is protected
in the law of contracts and in the torts of interference with
an advantageous relationship and defamation.
These powers are not absolute. Political philosophers
commonly assert that the price paid for securing the right
to property through the state was a sacrifice of the abso-
lute, though insecure, dominion over property that an in-
dividual might achieve alone. 8
The . . . Power . . . of doing whatsoever he thought fit for the
Preservation of himself.. .he gives up to be Regulated by Laws
made by the Society, so far forth as the preservation of
himself and the rest of that Society shall require; which
Laws of the Society in many things confine the liberty he
had by the Law of Nature.39
transaction' leading to an acceptable accommodation by a willing seller and a will-
ing buyer. See id.
33 Id. at 4.
34 Id. at 4-5.
35 Id. at 4.
36 Id. at 5.
37 Id. In explaining the role of defamation, Professor Epstein suggests that
"[d]efamation does not protect 'reputation' in the abstract; it protects advanta-
geous relationships against interference by misrepresentation." Id.
31 See id. at 4; LOCKE, supra note 22, at 352-53.
39 LOCKE, supra note 23, at 352-353. "Man loses by the social contract his natu-
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In theory that sacrifice may be complete.40 Locke sug-
gests a more limited view of the state: the property holder
sacrifices only as much power as is necessary for the effi-
cient and equitable functioning of society. 4' Thus in the
common law there exist exceptions to trespass limiting
the power to exclude, limitations on the liability of per-
sons interfering with possession, and exceptions to nui-
sance limiting the ability of property holders to use
property as they wish, etc.42 In the public sphere, the
state has the power to regulate use and disposition and
the power of eminent domain.43 However, the powers
must not be so restricted as to lose their meaning and ef-
fect in the social economy.4 4
ral liberty, and an unlimited right to all which tempts him, and which he can ob-
tain; in return he acquires civil liberty, and proprietorship of all he possesses."
RoussEAu, supra note 23, at 19.
40 Hobbes suggested the entire power over property belonged to the state:
The Distribution of the Materials... is the constitution of Mine, and
Thine, and His; that is to say, in one word Propriety; and belongeth in
all kinds of Common-wealth to the Soveraign Power. For where
there is no Common-wealth, there is (as hath been already shewn) a
perpetuall warre of every man against his neighbour; And therefore
every thing is his that getteth it, and keepeth it by force; which is
neither Propriety nor Community; but Uncertainty.
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 171 (Richard Tuck ed., 1991) (1651).
41 LOCKE, supra note 23, at 352.
42 See Epstein, Property and Necessity, supra note 25, at 6-7. He goes on to argue
that the exceptions produce a distribution of rights superior to that which would
exist in the absence of the exceptions. Id. at 8.
Is Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional Tradi-
tion, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 26 n.112 (1991). In the United States such regulation is
subject at least to the constitutional limitation that any regulation be rationally
related to a permissible government purpose under the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S.
Ct. 2791, 2801 (1992). In recent years this requirement has been easily satisfied,
admitting an argument that the Hobbesian formulation holds sway in this country.
But, under the same Amendment, any action deemed to be a taking of the prop-
erty requires public purpose and payment of just compensation to the former
holder of the property thereby limiting the government in a fashion. U.S. CONST.
amend XIV; see Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 308 (1939).
44 See Jeremy Paul, The Hidden Structure of Takings Law, 64 S. CAL. L. REv. 1393,
1423-25 (1991). This consideration is dictated by efficiency. The present state of
Eastern European economies is a practical argument against central planning im-
plicit in the total surrender of power to the state.
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2. Property Powers and Equity
The equity of the three power property right system as
described is supported in one sense by its economic effi-
ciency. In the aggregate, such a system theoretically pro-
duces the greatest level of social satisfaction achievable
with a given pool of property. Each holder will develop
his property to his greatest satisfaction, secure in the
knowledge that his investment will be protected by his
power of possession. If another distribution exists which
results in higher aggregate satisfaction, those persons
may seek each other out and dispose of their property in-
terests to obtain that greater satisfaction. In reality, ar-
guably, imperfections exist in the market and in property
regulation which prevents the achievement of any theoret-
ical maximum. One may agree with this argument and
still note that the experience of the industrialized world
indicates that generally higher levels of overall satisfac-
tion exist in those societies that have continued to main-
tain the property right powers.
The system is equitable in reality as well. First, the
maximizing of social satisfaction is not an inequitable end.
Second, with respect to the means, whatever inequities
may inhere in a system where the powers to possess, use,
and dispose were absolute are mitigated by the exceptions
to those powers developed through history as reflected in
the common law and by regulation.45 Equity is also ad-
dressed by the arguments of the natural rights philoso-
45 Regulation, being based on hypothetical results that are desired by the gov-
ernment, is probably less reliable and more subject to abuse than the common law
which was developed in the adjudication of factually real situations. As far as reg-
ulation is itself regulated by constitutional adjudication that considers real dis-
putes and draws on the case law the dangers to efficiency and equity posed by
regulation are mitigated.
Without a doubt though, regulation is problematic. "[T]he progression from
courts slighting property rights in the service of the general welfare to govern-
ments abrogating all property rights in the name of social justice seems to be... a
slippery slope." ELLEN F. PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN 191
(1987).
One check on the slippery slope may be the existence of multiple, competitive,
states. States choosing inefficient courses of action, such as usurpation of prop-
erty rights, will be subject to the presence of internal and external pressures to
1993] 1053
1054 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [58
phers, as will be seen in the following presentation.46
3. Initial Allocation of Property
There still remains the problem of the initial allocation
of property rights. This problem is of critical importance
in any discussion of unclaimed property such as outer
space. 47 With regard to regions already populated, the in-
itial allocation of property is often criticized. Even if it is
"decided that ownership is necessary to create effective
incentives for the development and improvement of prop-
erty" such "justifications for ownership do not solve the
more particular question of how given bits of property are
matched with given individuals."4
Locke took the position that 'first possession' or first
use established the right to exclude or title to property.
Whatsoever then he removes out of the State that Nature
hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his Labour with
it, and joyned to it something that is his own, and thereby
makes it his property. It being by him removed from the
common state Nature placed it in, hath by this labour
something annexed to it, that excludes the common right
of other Men. For this Labour being the unquestionable
Property of the Labourer, no Man but he can have a right
49to what that is once joyned to ....
restore those rights as they compete with efficient states. This argument should
apply both to states in our federal system and to states in the international system.
46 [A philosophical defense of property rights] has as its core the
concept of self-ownership; that is, that each person has the exclusive
right to the use, enjoyment, and disposition of his own body. What
follows from this is that he may exclude others from directing the
uses to which his body will be put or from appropriating parts of his
body. From this principle, I would generate a nearly inviolate right
to possess, use, dispose of, and exclude others from both the per-
sonal and real property ... previously unowned .... [I]t would be
limited by the traditional "sic utere" doctrine: Property may not be
used in a way that deprives others of the use of their property.
Ellen F. Paul, Natural Rights and Property Rights, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 10, 10
n.1 (1990).
47 Initial allocation is also a critical problem in those states that are seeking to
revert to a system of property rights after a long period of collective ownership.
48 Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, supra note 19, at 1220.
49 LOCKE, supra note 23, at 288. The labor referred to by Locke need not be
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His justification for first possession arises from natural
law. A basic proposition of this natural law is that "every
Man has a Property in his own Person. This no Body has any
Right to but himself. The Labour of his body, and the
Work of his Hands we may say, are properly his."' 50 To
deprive a man of the fruits of his labor or investment
would be unjust. Furthermore, first possession was not
unjust to any other man. "Nor was this appropriation of
any parcel of Land, by improving it, any prejudice to any
other Man, since there was still enough, and as good left;
and more than the yet unprovided could use."' 5' Locke
assumed that the appropriation occurred in a period with-
out scarcity; however, he did not invalidate the appropria-
tion when in later periods scarcity began to appear.
Locke has been criticized for failing to establish the
"prior right (good against the entire world) to perform the
labors upon which the claim for subsequent entitlement
rests."52 Yet, this is not entirely fair to Locke. The right
to possession is based upon the industriousness of the
claimant and the right rests on the benefit to society of
this possession.
God gave the World to Men in Common; but since he
gave it them for their benefit, and the greatest Convenien-
cies of Life they were capable to draw from it, it cannot be
supposed he meant it should always remain common and
uncultivated. He gave it to the use of the Industrious and
Rational, (and Labour was to be his title to it;). 53
Here Locke clearly anticipates the economists by speaking
in terms of benefit maximizing.
Another natural rights perspective suggests that thejus-
direct labor as he goes on to justify the accumulation of money and the use of
money for exchange. Direct labor is property itself under his theory and it may be
disposed in exchange for other ,property, including money. See PAUL, PROPERTY
RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 45, at 190.
5 Locke, supra note 23, at 287-288. See PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT
DOMAIN, supra note 45, at 193-239 (addressing weaknesses in Locke's logic).
51 LOCKE, supra note 23, at 291.
52 Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, supra note 19, at 1227.
53 LocKE, supra note 23, at 291.
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tification for the right lies partly in the "survivalist objec-
tive or value." 54
The survival of each individual 55 depends on his ability to
carry out purposive action. If the end results of this pur-
posive action are removed from the agent [of the creation
of property value]'s control, and employed by others to
satisfy their needs or desires, then the survival of... the
agent is put in jeopardy. But for the action of [the agent] no
good... would exist to satisfy any human's needs or desires. To
deny [the agent's] ownership-meaning the right to ex-
clude others from taking [the property] without [the
agent's] consent-would be tantamount to granting to
others, with [the same attributes as the agent], the right to
live parasitically off [the agent's] efforts. But no such right
could ever be defensible.5"
In spite of his criticism of the Lockean justification of
first possession, Professor Epstein determines that the al-
location to the first possessor is defensible. 57 He asserts
that some system of property rights is necessary and that
two systems present themselves: first possession systems
and systems creating "original common ownership in all
the citizens of the jurisdiction."58 The question then be-
comes "not how can any system of property rights bejusti-
fied in the abstract, but which of these two systems has,
when all is said and done, the better claim for alle-
giance." 59 The first factor to consider in the comparison
is the type of state required by each system. The rules of
first possession require a minimal state, while a system
based on common ownership requires "more extensive
- PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 45, at 232.
5 [And the survival of society in the aggregate?]
5 PAUL, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 45, at 232 (empha-
sis added). This justification could be reduced to economic benefit terms as well.
Paul asserts that this justification is less susceptible to use by 'maximizers' to de-
prive anyone of a property right merely because that right in other hands would
increase social utility. There is much more to Paul's theory than may be
presented here.




public control." 0 Second, if the system of common con-
trol is taken by the state, there is nothing that requires
such a system to restrict itself to acquisition of external
things. That is, "there is nothing in principle which says
that the theory could not be extended as well to govern
the way in which individuals acquire rights in themselves
.... [T]he theory of common ownership clearly seems to
lend itself to totalitarian uses and abuses.'
A fundamental objection to either system is that
"neither is powerful enough to bind non-consenting indi-
viduals."6 2 This objection seems to deny civil society any
organizing principle, even though such a principle is nec-
essary for civilization to exist. Epstein handles this di-
lemma by asserting the existence of civilization and
institutions. "[S]ome weight should be attached to the
rules under which a society in the past has organized its
property institutions."6 The "unique place of first pos-
session" rests in its having "enjoyed in all past times the
status of a legal rule."6'
Thus, those displacing such a system must bear the bur-
den ofjustification. Epstein asserts that, on Earth, this is a
very heavy burden since its repudiation would call into
question all titles.65 With respect to regions not yet
claimed or exploited, such as outer space, Epstein sug-
gests that the claim is less strong.66 And to the extent that
no old title or established expectation is called into ques-
tion, this may be true.
60 Id. at 1339.
61 Id. This argument may be related to Locke's theory of property rights.
Locke's fundamental assumption in justifying a rule of allocation by first posses-
sion was the right to one's own body and the uses to which it may be put. See
discussion supra note 47.
62 Epstein, Possession as the Root of the Title, supra note 19, at 1240.
63 Id. at 1241.
64 Id.
65 This is true even with respect to those states which do not recognize the
principle of first possession or property internally. Externally, their claims to
their lands and 'personal' property rest, or can be traced, to a first possession.
"[T]he sway of the first possession rule in international affairs is, if anything, more
pronounced than it is in private law contexts." Id. at 1242 n.27.
6 Id. at 1252.
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4. Conclusion
The practical problem of allocating those unclaimed
properties will remain and will manifest itself in two ways.
First, to the extent that it becomes desirable to utilize un-
claimed property, some incentive and guarantee must be
provided to stimulate that development. This problem is
considered in part II. C and part III of this note. Second,
the problem of allocating unclaimed properties will arise,
as it has historically, in disputes between rival claimants to
a property. The West has developed its institutions on
the basis of the validity of first possession. The continu-
ing viability of these institutions lies in their ability to re-
solve these disputes between claiments. The success of a
system on Earth should at least raise a presumption of its
utility in outer space.67
The point of the preceding discussion in this section
was to illustrate the foundations of property rights and
some considerations inherent in discussions of those
rights, not to argue for the philosophical correctness of
those rights. The sources cited, for the most part, are not
authoritative in any legal sense. Law itself develops in re-
sponse to real problems and thus has a historical basis.
Arguably, the philosophical justifications presented are
rationalizations of historical decisions. Their usefulness
lie, then, in their ability to condense the considerations
inherent in the legal decisions. Absent fundamental dif-
ferences between the property under consideration, a sys-
tem based on allocation by first possession, which was
historically valid, will continue to be a valid solution to
allocation in the future. And the philosophical justifica-
tions for the historical system will have validity in rational-
izing future applications of the system.
B. ELEMENTS OF PROPERTY LAW REQUIRED FOR THE
DEVELOPMENT OF SPACE RESOURCES
The opening section of this note suggested some of the
67 See infra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
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reasons for interest in the potential development of outer
space resources. Not surprisingly, these interests may be
reduced to the primary reasons for the development of
any resource: the potential for benefit to the developers
and the potential for benefit to society. It was also sug-
gested that the commercialization of space, through the
American system of free enterprise, was vital socially and
economically to the United States. 68 On Earth, an alloca-
tion system is based on property rights, including the
power to exclude-as granted to the first possessor,69 the
power to use, and the power to dispose. States enforce
this system according to sovereign power or international
agreement or custom. Which of these elements are
needed in outer space?
Commentators often state that space offers the oppor-
tunity for a fresh start in the relations between states.
Outer space is seen by some as an opportunity to test the
concept of world government, 7 or as an opportunity to
develop a new world order oriented toward people rather
than states. 71 One author asserts that space may be regu-
lated with the result of "avoiding seeds of conflict en-
- See supra text accompanying note 14. Such development is vital to the West,
generally, for economic and political reasons. See supra text accompanying notes
10-13. The property systems of the major Western industrialized states, and the
most successful of the Oriental states as well, are compatible.
69 Actual possession is required. Such possession requires actual use and does
not include idle reservations of rights for future use. Thus, had the U.S. actually
claimed the Moon for itself in 1969, the validity of such claim would be open to
challenge as no actual use was made of the vast majority of the Moon. Further-
more, even any claim to the locations where landing and use may be said to have
occurred could be challenged as abandoned.
70 Allen D. Webber, Note, Extraterrestrial Law on the Final Frontier: A Regime to
Govern the Development of Celestial Body Resources, 71 GEo. L.J. 1427, 1456 (1983).
71 "'Common heritage' is a term which appeals to the world order activist, but
only if it involves people in the shaping, as well as the sharing of values. [Com-
mon heritage of mankind] offers promise for a shift in power away from nation-
states, upward to international institutions, and downward to nongovernmental
organizations." A. Blaser, Note, The Common Heritage in Its Infinite Variety: Space Law
and the Moon in the 1990s, - GEO.J.L. & TECH. -, - (1991) (manuscript at 38-39,
on file with author). This sort of utopian populism puts one in mind of Rous-
seau's condemnation of democracy, "[wiere there a people of gods, it would gov-
ern itself democratically. So perfect a government is not suited to men,"
RouSSEAU, supra note 23, at 56, and may be subject to a similar criticism.
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countered through history on Earth."' 72 In spite of these
utopian sentiments, prospective developers of space will
be of the same stock as those that effectively developed
the resources of Earth." It would seem to follow that
these developers' security requirements would be the
same in outer space as they are on Earth. "Any private
industry which is considering activities in outer space will
seek in those activities the same degree of security which
it enjoys in its earthbound activities." 74
Thus, it seems reasonable to presume 75 that space ven-
turists will require the same rights and guarantees in
outer space that they require on Earth. Furthermore, it
seems reasonable to assume that those systems that are
efficient and equitable on Earth will also be efficient and
equitable in outer space.76 Man's operating environment
changes as he leaves the atmosphere of Earth behind; his
needs and shortcomings remain unchanged. The burden
should be on those who would propose alternative sys-
72 Martin Menter, Commercial Space Activities Under the Moon Treaty, 7 SYRACUSE J.
INT'L L. & COM. 213, 237 (1979-80). However, reality is recognized by some au-
thors. "History teaches us that whenever disputes arise over large quantities of
resources or large tracts of land, conflict is virtually inevitable." Barritt, supra
note 10, at 616 (citing as examples range wars in the settlement of the American
West and the California gold rush).
72 A German jurist writes: "[T]he generalized formulas of the Space Treaty
show a clear tendency to conceal reality in that they speak of a harmonious world,
while leaving the numerous conflicts of interest largely unsolved ...." Adrian
Buekling, The Strategy of Semantics and the "Mankind Provisions" of the Space Treaty, 7J.
SPACE L. 15, 18 (1979).
71 Roger K. Hoover, Law and Security in Outer Space from the Viewpoint of Private
Industry, 11 J. SPACE L. 115, 116 (1983). "For commercial ventures to expend the
capital, time, and risk necessary for the successful commercialization of space,
there must be a stable and predictable environment for investment." Kosmo,
supra note 4, at 1065.
75 See supra note tex following 60.
76 Market allocation of property rights in space has been argued to be more
efficient than non-market mechanism. Clas G. Wihlborg and Per Wijkman, Outer
Space Resources in Efficient and Equitable Use: New Frontiers for Old Principles, 24 J. L. &
ECoN. 23, 28-37 (1981). To achieve efficiency, "markets for space resources
should have the following properties: (A) complete allocation regime, (B) divisible
and marketable user rights, (C) long contract periods, (D) well defined liability
rules." Id. at 29. Although using the language of contract rather than the com-
mon law language of estates, this prescription is closely analogous to the require-
ments for an efficient system of property on Earth.
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tems to prove the superiority of such a system over any
historically successful system. Without accepting the bur-
den of proving the necessity of historic rights and guaran-
tees, the following discussion is offered to suggest the
similarity of needs on Earth and in outer space.
The discussion of the power to exclude in the previous
section suggested the necessity of granting that power to
the developer thus ensuring the fruits of his investment
and the efficiency of his use. Private industrialists have
argued the need for the power to exclude,7 7 and govern-
mental venturers surely want the same power. The power
to use is essential to development and would be a neces-
sary element of space property.7s A method of creating
the property right initially, or obtaining title, is needed as
well. Though it is conceivable that a system of allocation
that limits the power to dispose might be workable,7 9 on
Earth, the power of disposition is believed to enhance the
value of property rights, creating an incentive to invest
and increasing the efficiency of the system. 0 Finally,
there must exist a mechanism of guaranteeing and enforc-
ing those rights to give them value. This is no less true in
space than on Earth.
II. SPACE LAW AND PROPERTY
This part examines the current status of space law and
property. The first section examines treaties and custom-
ary law in space relating to property. The second section
presents a discussion of the developing 'law' relating to
the allocation of geostationary orbit positions. Included
in that section is a discussion of the geostationary orbit,
77 "Private industry would want to be assured that, once having established its
operations in some outer space location, it could conduct those operations with-
out interference from others." Hoover, supra note 74, at 120. See also Kosmo,
supra note 4, at 1084 (resources reduced to possession and processed should be-
long to the entrepreneur who took the risks).
78 "An acceptable system must stipulate the right of continued use in space re-
sources." Kosmo, supra note 4, at 1084. See also supra text accompanying notes
28-31.
79 See discussion infra Parts II B-C.
- See supra note 32 accompanying text.
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its importance, and the institutions and processes regulat-
ing its use. The final section concludes with an evaluation
of the adequacy of the existing space law, including the
law on allocation of geostationary orbit, for the efficient
and equitable development of space resources.
A. Current Status of Space Property Law
1. Treaties Governing Property Rights in Space
The principal treaties dealing with the utilization of
outer space resources are the Outer Space Treaty8 1 and
the Moon Treaty.82 Both are multilateral treaties that
originated in the United Nations Committee on the Peace-
ful Uses of Outer Space.83 The Outer Space Treaty was
ratified by the United States Senate, in 1967, while the
Moon Treaty was not. The Outer Space Treaty was rati-
fied by ninety-eight states; the Moon Treaty was ratified
by only seven states.84
a. Outer Space Treaty of 1967
The preamble to the Outer Space Treaty recognizes the
"exploration and use" of outer space.85 With regard to
"exploration and use," however, the states who signed
the treaty recognize, believe, and desire that such activity
be carried out for the benefit of all mankind and for
peaceful purposes.8 6 Clearly the states who are parties to
the treaty anticipated the exploration and use of outer
space and have approved of such activity. The activity is
not in any way limited by the preamble, which can best be
81 See supra note 1.
82 See supra note 5.
83 Michel Bour~ly, The Contributions Made by International Organizations to the For-
mation of Space Law, 10J. SPACE L. 139, 145-47 (1982).
84 U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, PUB. No. 9433 A LIST OF TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNA-
TIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES IN FORCE ON JANUARY 1, 1990, (1990)
(Outer Space Treaty in force); Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary Gen-
eral--Status as at 31 December 1989 at 327, U.N. Doc., ST/LEG/SER.E/8, U.N.
Sales No. E.90.v.6 (1990) (lists states that ratified Moon Treaty).




seen as an expression of hope that such activities will be
useful to mankind and will not become a source of conflict
or danger to the Earth. The preamble generally provides
a context for the authoritative articles of the treaty and is
not itself meant to be binding, nor is it expressed in bind-
ing language. 7
Article I purports to govern the exploration and use of
outer space. The first section states that exploration and
use "shall be carried out for the benefit and in the inter-
ests of all countries, irrespective of their degree of eco-
nomic or scientific development, and shall be the province
of all mankind. 8 88 The first paragraph of Article I recog-
nizes that space will be used and approves of that use sub-
ject to vaguely expressed qualifications.8 9
The major space powers believe that their activities in
space are not limited by any obligation set forth in Article
I. When the treaty was ratified in the United States Senate
it was "the understanding of the Committee on Foreign
Relations that nothing in Article I, paragraph 1, [of the
Treaty] diminishes or alters the right of the United States
to determine how ... it shares the benefits and results of
its space activities." 90 A leading authority asserts the posi-
87 "The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise,
in addition to the text .... its preamble and annexes .. " Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, art. 31(2), § 3, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27 (-); 63 AM.J. INT.
L. 875, 885 (1969) (not ratified by the U.S.; adopted by the UN in 1969, entered
into force in 1981).
88 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art I.
89 Commentator Buekling noted that "mankind" lacks meaning in international
law. He believed that the use of the word, without any legal meaning, was meant
to both express hopes for a "state of affairs ... yet to be attained" and to conceal
the large measure of conflict of interest unresolved by the treaty between the state
parties. Buekling, supra note 72, at 20. "Underneath the 'mankind' syndrome the
relevant clauses of the Space Treaty offer little guidance as to what States may
derive from them. Neither can it be satisfactorily established what rights a State
not involved in space exploration might have in the achievements of the space
powers." Id.
- Treaty on Outer Space: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 74 (1967). One observer interpreted this as an admission
of at least some obligation to share on the part of the U.S. Siegfried Wiessner, The
Public Order of the Geostationary Orbit: Blueprints for the Future, 9 YALE J. WORLD PUB.
ORD. 217, 252 (1983).
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tion of the United States that is Article I "a statement of
general goals" and that the ratification of specialized trea-
ties is necessary to create any specific obligations. 9' The
U.S.S.R was of the opinion that the 'mankind provisions'
of the Treaty, including Article 1, paragraph 1, have no
"precise significance ' '9 2 and that "the character and de-
gree of participation of States in international space
projects [such as the sharing of benefits] depend, ulti-
mately on their will" which must be expressed in specific
treaties.93 No claims have ever been asserted against a
space power under this provision, further evidencing that
a belief exists among non-space powers that Article I cre-
ates no specific obligation on the space powers.94 With
these factors in mind, Jasentuliyana 95 concluded that the
obligations of Article I paragraph 1 "constitute more
a moral and philosophical obligation than a legal
requirement. 96
Paragraph 2 of Article I establishes the right of access
to outer space.97 This paragraph, however, cannot be rea-
sonably understood as creating positive obligations on the
space powers to enable such access. An interesting fea-
9' NandasariJasentuliyana, Article I of the Outer Space Treaty Revisited, 17J. SPACE
L. 129, 139 (1989) (citing Senate Committee and the State Department sources).
At the time "[t]he belief that agreement must be reached as soon as possible af-
fected the matter of whether the agreement should be limited to a statement of
general principles or whether it should establish more specific regulation of space
activity." Paul G. Dembling and Daniel M. Arons, The Evolution of the Outer Space
Treaty, 33 J. AIR L. & CoM. 419, 428 (1967) (Dembling was General Counsel to
NASA at the time of the treaty negotiations). The former course was apparently
taken. "The Preamble and Articles I, II and III of the Treaty state broad princi-
ples which, from the outset of discussion, were generally acceptable to the mem-
bers of the Subcommittee and provoked little disagreement as to wording." Id. at
429.
92 Buekling, supra note 72, at 19.
93 Jasentuliyana, supra note 91, at 140 (quoting Soviet delegate to COPUOS).
4 Id.
95 Jastentuliyana is Director of Outer Space Affairs Division of the United
Nations.
- Jasentuliyana, supra note 91, at 130; see also David Goldman, Settlement and
Sovereignty on Outer Space, 22 U. W. ONT. L. REV. 155, 157-158 (1984).
97 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. 1, 2. "Outer space, including the
moon and other celestial bodies, shall be free for exploration and use by all states
without discrimination" Id.
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ture of this paragraph is its provision that access will be
granted "in accordance with international law." 98 Based
partly on this provision, as well as other considerations, it
is generally agreed that international law is applicable to
supplement and clarify the Outer Space Treaty, which
may be thought of as containing only the leading, albeit
vague, principles. 99
Article II prohibits national appropriation of outer
space. 0 0 The mandate of this provision is seemingly
clear.' 0 1 When strictly interpreted, however, individual
appropriation may not be prohibited, 0 2 even though the
existence of any mechanism to secure the appropriation is
in question. While, "[t]he establishment of a permanent
settlement or the carrying out of commercial activities by
nationals of a country on a celestial body may constitute
national appropriation if the activities take place under
the supreme authority (sovereignty) of the state[,]"' 0 3
given the obligation of each state to oversee the activities
of its nationals in outer space under Article VI and the
liability of the state for actions of its nationals under Arti-
cle VII of the Outer Space Treaty and the Liability Con-
vention, 0 4 it is extremely unlikely that any state would
98 Id.
Cestmir Cepelka & Jamie H. Gilmour, The Application of General International
Law in Outer Space, 36J. AIR L. & CoM. 30, 30 (1970). "[Gleneral international
law, which governs the conduct of states in their mutual relations, is not confined
to the ill-defined upper limit of national airspace, but is applicable to activities of
states in the vast realm of outer space. Thus the Space Treaty incorporates rule of
general international law, apart from norms of legis specialis derogating there-
from." Id. Article III also incorporates international law into outer space. See
Dembling, supra note 82, at 431-32.
-0 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. II. "Outer space, including the moon
and other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of
sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means." Id.
10, For a strict view of Article II, see Stephen Gorove, Interpreting Article 11 of the
Outer Space Treaty, 37 FORDHAM L. REVIEw 349 (1969).
102 Id. at 351.
o10 Id. at 352.
04 Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
opened for signature Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 (entered into
force on Sept. 1, 1972) [hereinafter the Liability Convention]. United States over-
sight is reflected in the licensing requirements for commercial space launches em-
bodied in the Commercial Space Launch Act, Pub. L. No. 98-575, § 6, 98 Stat.
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allow activity by its nationals without some regulation and
sanction.10 5 Thus, the ban on appropriation is, to some
extent, inconsistent with the requirements of other multi-
lateral treaties.
When read in conjunction with other articles of the
treaty, the meaning of the Article II prohibition becomes
even less certain. National appropriation by any of the
listed means is clearly prohibited; 0 6 but it may be argued
that property rights may be obtained and a form of quasi-
sovereignty may exist under the Outer Space Treaty.
"The general principle of non-appropriation is, in effect,
circumscribed to an extent by treaty provisions designed
to facilitate the exploration and use of outer space."'10 7
Summarizing the argument, Article I specifically provides
for use of outer space. "In its legal sense, 'use' usually
refers to the enjoyment of property .... "108 Therefore,
in order to facilitate the use contemplated in Article I,
some form of appropriation must be permissible. Article
IV prohibits the establishment of facilities on celestial
bodies for military purposes. By implication, facilities for
3055 (1984). Section 2 states that the United States will, "to the extent necessary,
regulate such launches and services in order to ensure compliance with interna-
tional obligations of the United States ..... Id.
The United States is currently appraising its oversight through the National
Space Council. "It is the sense of Congress that the National Space Council
should, by October 1, 1991, establish guidelines and policy recommendations,
including the need for licensing, for the conduct of expendable launch vehicle
operations in which a Federal agency assumes substantial responsibility for public
safety, indemnification, and administrative oversight." NASA Authorization Act,
supra note 2, § 108(b).
105 Cepelka & Gilmour, supra note 99, at 38, reached the same conclusion, with-
out reference to outer space liability laws, based on the erroneous deduction that
Art. II implied that territorial jurisdiction may not exist. The better view is that
Art VIII permits at least a form of territorial jurisdiction. See infra note 109 and
accompanying text.
0 See Cepelka and Gilmour, supra note 99, at 32 (discussion of forms of appro-
priation including 'occupation' and 'means of use').
107 Goldman, supra note 96, at 158.
01 Id. The passage continues, "often with an advantage or profit arising there-
from, by the occupancy, utilization or exercise of the property." Id. In the de-
bates on the Outer Space Treaty, "[a]lthough there was some difference of
opinion over the meaning of the word 'use,' as distinguished from 'exploration,' it
appeared that most of the delegations agreed with the French delegate that 'use'
means 'exploitation.' " Dembling & Arons, supra note 91, at 431.
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peaceful uses of space are permissible. Article VIII pro-
vides for the retention of ownership of objects launched
into space and jurisdiction over the objects, and person-
nel, so launched by the state of registry. 0 9 If these ob-
jects and personnel settle on a celestial body, the exercise
ofjurisdiction "amounts to the exercise of sovereign pow-
ers in an area of outer space.""10 Article VI, which pro-
vides for national responsibility for objects launched into
space, supports this conclusion."'
The power to exclude may also be inferred from the
Outer Space Treaty." 2 Article IX contains an injunction
to consult with other states before conducting activities
that "would cause potentially harmful interference with
activities of other State Parties in the peaceful exploration
and use of outer space, including the moon and other ce-
lestial bodies. . .11'3 This clause is interpreted as requir-
ing consultation when the consequence of activity to
another party is uncertain." 14 Activities that will harmfully
interfere are prohibited, without the need for consulta-
tion, as an implicit consequence of the creation of mean-
ingful user rights alluded to in Article IX." 5
The interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty that al-
lows property holding in space and quasi-sovereignty
must, by inference, allow for some form of reasonable
first use method of allocation." 6 Since the Outer Space
Treaty envisions use of space, but does not establish any
regulatory regime to oversee allocations of outer space,
first use is the only possible form of allocation. This
could take the form of occupation and reasonable use.' "7
-09 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. VIII.
10 Goldman, supra note 96, at 159.
- Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. VI.
112 Goldman, supra note 96, at 160-61.
11 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. IX (emphasis added).
"4 Goldman, supra note 96, at 161.
1"I Id. at 160-61.
"6 Barritt, supra note 10, at 636.
117 A reasonable use doctrine governs water use law. "[T]he 'reasonable use'
doctrine, grants a riparian owner the right to be free from unreasonable uses of
the watercourse by other riparian owners. The goal of this approach is to make
10671993]
1068 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE [58
But, it is still difficult to distinguish this private appropria-
tion with national sanction under national jurisdiction
from a form of national appropriation at some level." 8
The Outer Space Treaty may simply be vague, and hence
merely precatory, on the issues of use and appropriation.
The consequence of this could be to make the treaty non-
binding as creating no specific rule on these issues by
analogy to the treatment of Article I.
The Outer Space Treaty also allows for withdrawal, in
which case the treaty would not be binding to the with-
drawing state." 19 It is argued, however, that the treaty has
become a statement of customary law. 12 0 This conclusion
is based partly on the acquiescence of states to the princi-
ples embodied in the treaty before and after its ratifica-
tion.' 2  If these principles are indeed customary law, then
the withdrawing state may be bound by them despite its
withdrawal. 22 Two points must be remembered though.
First, any law based on customary principles will be at
least as vague and contradictory as the treaty embodying
those principles. Second, irrespective of obligations
under customary law, the treaty itself will not be binding
as it specifically allows for withdrawal.
b. The Moon Treaty
The Moon Treaty introduces the concept of the com-
mon heritage of mankind to considerations of space prop-
full and beneficial use of a watercourse. Water may be put to any use, so long as
reasonable uses by other riparian owners are not adversely affected." Barritt,
supra note 10, at 637-38 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, ch. 41, Interfer-
ence With the Use of Water ("Riparian Rights"). Such a form of allocation seems com-
pletely compatible with Article IX of the Outer Space Treaty.
118 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
"9 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, art. XVI.
120 Wiessner, supra note 90, at 246.
12, Goldman, supra note 96, at 168; Cepelka & Gilmour, supra note 99, at 46
("state that are Parties to the Space Treaty which exercise their right to withdraw
... will be bound.., by some general international law rules of ajus cogens charac-
ter, while, on the other hand, they will retain full right to derogate from other
rules of general international law which are in principle, juris dispositivi.").
122 The topic of customary law in space will be considered more completely
infra notes 128-135 and accompanying text.
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erty law. The obligations incurred by states under this
principle, and the Moon Treaty itself, are unclear and
have been the subject of much commentary.12 3 The Moon
Treaty outlaws property rights in any celestial body ab-
sent the establishment of an international regime. 24 The
Moon Treaty also aims at closing the avenue toward prop-
erty and quasi-sovereignty left by the Outer Space
Treaty. 25 The Moon Treaty, however, has yet not been
ratified by any major space power and has been signed by
very few states. 2 6 It is not binding as a treaty on the non-
party states and the claim that it represents customary law
is probably not credible. 27
c. Customary Law
The Outer Space Treaty supports the proposition that
international law is applicable in outer space. 28 This is a
logical conclusion since international law is meant to reg-
ulate the relations between states wherever such states
may come into contact outside of some national jurisdic-
tion. Custom is an established source of international
123 E.g., Moon Treaty Report, supra note 5; Christopher C. Joyner, Legal Implica-
tions of the Concept of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 190
(1986); Mary V. White, Note, The Common Heritage of Mankind: An Assessment, 14
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 509 (1982); Kosmo, supra note 4, at 1078; Richard D.
Cunningham, Space Commerce and Secured Financing New Frontiers for the U.C.C., 40
Bus. LAw. 803, 807 (1985); Menter, Commercial Space Activities Under the Moon Treaty,
supra note 71; Barritt, supra note 10, at 628; Raclin, supra note 4, at 737.
124 Moon Treaty, supra note 5, art. 11, para. 3.
'25 Id. "The placement of personnel, space vehicles, equipment, facilities, sta-
tions and installations on or below the surface of the moon, including structures
connected with its surface or the subsurface, shall not create a right of ownership
over the surface or the subsurface of the moon or any areas thereof." Id. Article
12 continues to allow jurisdiction and ownership of material launched into space,
which supports, interpreting, the Outer Space Treaty as allowing some appropria-
tion. See supra notes 97-103 and accompanying text.
126 Australia, a state with some space activity, has ratified the treaty. See supra
note 83.
127 Vladlen Vereshchetin & Gennaly M. Danilenko, Custom as a Source of Interna-
tional Law of Outer Space, 13 J. SPACE L. 22, 33-34 (1985) ("[ilt seems ... hardly
possible to accept such a contention" that the Moon Treaty represents custom).
128 See supra text accompanying notes 97-98.
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law' 2 9 and will then, in general, apply in outer space.
"Custom in international law is a practice followed by
those concerned because they feel legally obliged to be-
have in such a way."' 30
While it may be accepted that custom extends to outer
space, the content of the customary law is open to ques-
tion. Some argue that the Outer Space Treaty may repre-
sent principles of customary law in outer space,' 3 ' but this
assertion must be reconciled with the lack of practice in
general with respect to exploitation of the resources of
outer space and property rights in particular. The experi-
ence so far is limited to the use of geostationary orbit po-
sitions 132 and non-permanent moon visits where limited
amounts of lunar material were removed and no claims of
national appropriation were made. "The fact that prac-
tice has been engaged in only for a brief period of time
will not in itself be a bar to the formation of a customary
rule ... Within the specified period of time, how-
ever, "[s]tate practice ... should have been both exten-
sive and virtually uniform."'13 4
129 Statute of the International Court of Justice, annexed to the Charter of the
United Nations, art. 38, part B, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. No. 933 (1945).
130 REBECCA M. WALLACE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (1986).
"'1 See supra note 108 and accompanying text. Some parts of a treaty may repre-
sent customary law while other parts may not. For example, the general princi-
ples of art. I and art. 2 of the Outer Space Treaty "which have been carried
forward" from prior statements of law and practice may be custom while the obli-
gations of other provisions, such as the right to access in art. XII, may not be
custom. Goldman, supra note 96, at 167.
3s2 See discussion infra part I.B. So far as practice is concerned there, the rule of
allocation has been first-come, first-served. See Michael S. Straubel, Telecommunica-
tion Satellites and Market Forces: How Should the Geostationary Orbit Be Regulated by the
FC.C., 17 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 205, 209 (1992). To date, states have
respected those allocations.
"s3 Wallace, supra note 130, at 9. "[I]nternational law does not require the
existence of practice from 'times immemorial' for the creation of customary
rules." Vereshchetin & Danilenko, supra note 127, at 25.
1s4 North Sea Continental Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 43.
Customary international law can not come into being 'instantly' be-
cause custom is based on constant and uniform practice. The con-
solidation and recognition of general, constant and uniform state
practice require the existence of a number of precedents. It is obvi-




Thus, the limited number of research oriented visits to
the Moon do not make a strong case for any custom with
respect to resource exploitation. "In any event, one thing
that can be said with certainty is that custom, as a source
of international law, cannot create legal obligations con-
cerning the future exploitation of the natural resources of
the Moon before such exploitation becomes feasible and
the relations of the state with respect to this problem ac-
quire the necessary level of consistency and uniform-
ity." 35 Since the principles of the Outer Space Treaty
antedate any practice in resource exploitation on celestial
bodies, it cannot yet represent custom. 3 6 To the extent
that any custom exists, it must be found in some actual
practice. The developing law of geostationary orbit allo-
cation may be such a source, though the analogy between
the use of a position in space as a resource and the use of
the resources of a celestial body may not be sufficiently
close to create a precedent in law. The allocation of geos-
tationary orbits and its adequacy as a model for the devel-
opment of a law of property rights in celestial bodies is
the subject of the next sections of this Note.
B. DEVELOPING 'PROPERTY LAW' IN GEOSTATIONARY
ORBIT
This Section examines the developing law of property
in outer space relating to the allocation of geostationary
orbit positions. Included in this Section is a discussion of
the geostationary orbit, its importance and the institu-
tions and processes regulating its use. While the rele-
Vereshchetin & Danilenko, supra note 127, at 25 n.6.
"'5 Vereshchetin & Danilenko, supra note 127, at 34.
136 Cf Goldman, supra note 96, at 168. David Goldman agrees that there is to
date very little state practice which may constitute unequivocal evidence of states
abiding by the principles of the Outer Space Treaty. Id. But, there is evidence
that shows the space powers have refrained from asserting sovereign claims or
from denying freedom of use. Id. He concludes, at least with respect to these
elements, that custom should be taken as established to avoid "friction because of
long-standing expectations." Id. One might argue, however, that there are no
realistic expectations with respect to utilization among the non-space powers be-
cause there has been no practice aimed at giving these states space capabilities.
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vance of this body of law to the allocation of rights in
celestial bodies is uncertain, the geostationary orbit is the
only current area of practice in the utilization of a space
resource. Since only practice can generate custom, and
accepted practice serves to illuminate the meaning of
vague treaty terms, geostationary orbit practices are sig-
nificant in the development of space property law. The
allocation of voids, however, whose only significance is
their location relative to points on the Earth, may not be
adequately analogus to the allocation of celestial bodies.
Indeed, in terms existing law, the voids may be likened to
the seas and celestial bodies to the land. On Earth, com-
pletely different legal regimes exist for the seas and the
lands and it would not be illogical to carry that practice
into outer space.
I. The Geostationary Orbit and Its Importance
Geostationary orbit is a circular orbit in the plane of the
Earth's equator approximately 22,300 miles above the
Earth's surface. 37 At that altitude, a satellite in the geos-
tationary orbit rotates about the Earth's axis at a rate of
once per day, the same as the corresponding point on the
Earth's surface.' 3 8 To an observer standing at a point on
the Earth's surface, the satellite will appear to be fixed in
space. 39 The significance of this phenomenon lies in the
simplicity of the antenna-tracking equipment required for
communication with a geostationary satellite and the abil-
ity of a single satellite to maintain constant coverage of a
locus of points on the Earth's surface. The combination
137 OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT, RADIOFREQUENCY USE AND MANAGE-
MENT IMPACTS FROM THE WORLD ADMINISTRATIVE RADIO CONFERENCE OF 1979 73
(1982) [hereinafter OTA WARC Report].
138 Id.
139 The satellite is, of course, moving through space and does not remain physi-
cally fixed in any spot relative to other celestial bodies. At any other altitude, the
satellite velocity required to match the rotation of the Earth results in an unstable
orbit. A complete discussion of the geostationary and related orbits may be found
in Background Paper for the Second United Nations Conference on the Exploration and Peace-
ful Uses of Outer Space, Efficient Use of the Geostationary Orbit, at 5-9 U.N. Doc. A/
CONF. 1O1/BP/7 (1981) [hereinafter Unispace Report].
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of these two factors makes satellites in geostationary orbit
ideal for communications purposes.140
The number of satellites that may effectively use the ge-
ostationary orbit is limited by two factors. The first limit-
ing factor is the potential for interference, which includes
physical interference, through collisions, and radio inter-
ference. Physical interference is not generally thought to
be significantly limiting. "With consideration only for
avoidance of physical collisions between satellites, the
number of satellites that can be placed in the geostation-
ary orbit is nearly unlimited."' 4' Radio interference is po-
tentially much more significant; however, advancing
technology and careful coordination will tend to reduce
the impact of the interference limitation.
At the end of 1984 a total of 138 satellites of all types
were operating in geostationary orbit, including eighty
communications satellites. 42 The minimum spacing re-
140 Id. at 9-12. Both interactive communications and broadcasting. There are
many other uses for geostationary orbit as well, but these uses do not create
nearly as much demand for allocations of orbit positions. Id.
141 OTA WARC Report, supra note 137, at 73. Active satellites which are able to
maintain station are not likely to collide. "Since most satellites are able to main-
tain their position within [plus or minus] 0.1 degree of longitude, there are 1800
'slots' each 0.2 degree wide, in the geostationary orbit such that there would be
no risk of collision between functioning satellites." Unispace Report, supra note
139, at 21. WARC 79 reduced the station keeping tolerance for fixed satellite
service to plus or minus 0.1 degree. Id. Ten operative satellites could occupy
each slot and there would still be fewer than 1 collision per 400,000 years. Id. at
12. If 110 active and 310 inactive satellites occupied the geostationary orbit, each
with an average cross-sectional area of 168 m2 , the probability of a collision would
be 9.7 x 10- 4. Id. at 13.
The danger of collision with inactive satellites may be easily resolved if these
satellites are removed from geostationary orbit by boosting the satellite to a new
orbit at the end of its useful life. Id. at 13-14. "[I]nactive satellites should be
boosted into a circular orbit at least 300 km farther out." OFFICE OF TECH. As-
SESSMENT, ORBITING DEBRIS: A SPACE ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEM 26 (1990) (citing
V.A. Chobotov, Disposal of Spacecraft at End-of-Life in Geosynchronous Orbit, AAS/
AIAA Astrodynamic Specialist Conference (1989)). However, "[i]f a satellite in an
orbit less than 160 km beyond [geostationary orbit] were to break up, roughly half
of its fragments would eventually drift back through [geostationary orbit], posing
a greater hazard to active satellites along the orbital band than if the satellite had
remained in [geostationary orbit]." Id. See also Wiessner, supra note 90, at 225-28
(pessimistic discussion of inactive satellites and space junk hazards).
142 Steven E. Doyle, Regulating the Geostationay Orbit: ITU's WARC-ORB -'85-'88,
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quired in 1981 to avoid radio interference was between
three and five degrees.1 43  By utilizing advances in an-
tenna design that were foreseeable in 1981, the minimum
required space between satellites could be reduced by
half. This would result in 144 to 240 nominal slots.
There are currently three frequency bands used for com-
munications, 144 which means that between 432 and 720
communications systems could operate in the orbit. This
number could easily be increased by use of technology
that has been available and in limited use since 1981.
First, beam polarization could double the number systems
operating in the orbit since adjacent satellites using the
same frequency band could use radiation with different
polarizations. This would increase the capacity of the
orbits from 720 to 1,200 slots. 145 Furthermore, systems
aimed at geographically separated points on the Earth will
not interfere. Conservatively, the capacity of the orbit is
doubled by having adjacent systems serve points alterna-
tively in the northern and southern hemisphere. 146 This
results in 1,440 to 2,400 slots. 147 The use of uplink/
downlink reversal could increase the number of satellites
by 70 to 90 percent, resulting in 2,450 to 4,560 slots! 148
15J. SPACE L. 1, 8-9 (1987) (citing ITU WARC-ORB 85 Second Advisory Commit-
tee Report (1985), submitted in F.C.C. Doc. Gen. 80-741 (Jan. 31, 1985)).
,43 Unispace Report, supra note 139, at 17.
144 Id. at 20.
145 This number is calculated by doubling the capacity of the lower two fre-
quency bands and leaving the upper band alone since, at the higher frequencies,
there are technical problems with depolarization due to precipitation. Unispace
Report, supra note 139, at 20.
146 Id. The service areas probably do not need to be separated so greatly.
"Sharing the geostationary orbit in a particular frequency band is principally a
problem of sharing between adjacent countries." OTA WARC Report, supra note
137, at 73. Some would argue that there is no demand for service in the southern
hemisphere so these gains are illusory. Id. at 73-74. However, these gains should
serve to comfort the developing nations of the world, the majority of which are
located in the southern hemisphere, since the use of the orbit by northern states
does not preempt the use by southern states. Id.
141 See Michael J. Finch, Note, Limited Space: Allocating the Geostationary Orbit, 7
Nw.J. INT'L L. & Bus. 788, 789 (1986) (citing Paris Arnopolous, The International
Politics of the Orbit Spectrum Issue, 7 ANNALS AIR & SPACE L. 215, 216 (1982) (theo-
retical capacity is about 2,000 satellites)).
148 Unispace Report, supra note 139, at 20. Information is sent to satellites via
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By these simple calculations, there is room for at least
twenty times as many satellites in geostationary orbit as
currently reside there. 49
The second limiting factor is geometrical. 150 The satel-
lite serving a point on the Earth must be visible from that
point on the Earth. Furthermore, because of atmospheric
attenuation of signals, prudent practice indicates that the
satellite must be at least ten degrees above the horizon at
the service point. 151 One interesting consequence of this
limitation is that the larger the area to be served, the more
limited the possible positions for the satellite. 52 There is,
however, flexibility in the placement of satellites serving
smaller countries, such as many of the developing
countries.
2. The ITU and the Space WARC
The geostationary orbit clearly may be considered a
limited natural resource. 5 3  It is, however, a resource
whose limits may be expanded through advances in tech-
nology. Nevertheless, coordination and regulation is ap-
propriate to protect valuable investments in that orbit.
The most important organization serving these needs is
the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) act-
ing through the World Administrative Radio Conference
(WARC). 154
uplinks and that information is broadcast back to Earth via downlinks. In 1981, all
uplinks used the same frequency bands and all downlinks used the same fre-
quency bands. Id. If two satellites in nearby positions used uplink and downlink
frequencies in the reverse sense, the potential for interference would decrease.
The difficulties associated with administration, however, would increase. Id.
'49 This is admittedly a simplistic analysis that does not take into account many
coordination problems, but it does illustrate the number of satellites that may use
the orbit and the potential effects of technological advances on that capacity. See
Wiessner, supra note 90, at 232 (technology considerations taken into account in
the ITU Regional Plan for the Americas).
150 OTA WARC Report, supra note 137, at 73.
151 Unispace Report, supra note 139, at 5.
152 Id. at 6.
1" Id. at 4; Doyle, supra note 142, at 3; Bourely, supra note 83, at 149.
'54 The UN's COPOUS claims authority for the general coordination of space
activities. E.g., Unispace Report, supra note 139, at 4. So far, however, the CO-
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The ITU is the oldest specialized agency of the United
Nations. It was originally established as the International
Telegraph Union in 1865. Since that time, the ITU has
had a continuous role in the regulation and coordination
of international communications.155 Further, ITU was the
first U.N. agency to produce regulations covering the use
of outer space.' 56 These regulations emerge from the
works of WARC. The WARC's primary function is to allo-
cate to states frequencies for radio communications. 157
Because of the intimate relationship between frequencies
and orbit position in the geostationary orbit, the task of
coordinating allocation of those positions has fallen on
the ITU. 158
3. Regulating the Use of the Geostationary Orbit
The Outer Space Treaty provides little guidance for the
allocation of geostationary orbit positions. The applica-
ble articles include Article I, which calls for free access by
all states, and Article II, which prohibits national appro-
priation.15 9 The initial ITU regulations and the initial use
of geostationary orbit predate the Treaty,' 60 and the ratifi-
cation of the Treaty did not have any immediate or spe-
cific impact on the ITU conventions. The users of
geostationary orbit favor the non-appropriation clause 16'
with respect to geostationary orbit and support the idea of
POUS has been hampered by political squabbles and the ITU has effectively led
the development of the geostationary orbit.
155 Doyle, supra note 142, at 2.
156 Bourely, supra note 83, at 148, 148 n.38 (earliest regulation of space dates
from 1965).
157 Id. at 148; Doyle, supra note 142, at 10.
158 Doyle, supra note 142, at 5.
159 Outer Space Treaty, supra note 1, 18 U.S.T. at 2412-13.
- Experimental use began in 1962; the first commercial user, Early Bird, was
launched in April, 1965. Doyle, supra note 142, at 5.
161 Thus, a proposed revision of the ITU Convention is criticized by an advisor
to the F.C.C. because "its effect is to give nations permanent rights to orbital
claims." Doyle, supra note 142, at 16. The users' obvious favor for the non-ap-
propriations clause was apparent by the negative response to the claims by equa-
torial states to sovereignty over the portions of the orbit in the arcs above their
territory. See Arnopolous, supra note 147, at 220 (discussing the legal status of the
geostationary orbit with respect to the claims of equatorial states).
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free access. 162 At one of the first conferences following
the ratification of the Outer Space Treaty, it was conceded
that "all States [have] an equal right to the use of frequen-
cies and to the use of geostationary orbit. Conversely, no
State has or acquires a permanent right to an orbit merely
from the fact of having put a satellite into orbit and having
occupied certain positions on that orbit."'' 63 The ITU
regulations seem to accord with the principles contained
in the Outer Space Treaty.
Traditionally, the key to the ITU's regulatory process
has been the coordination of problems arising between
users of the geostationary orbit. "The process provided
for in the regulations involves three basic steps: (1) ad-
vance publication of a proposed satellite system through
the IFRB [International Frequency Registration Board],
(2) coordination of any identified problems involving
other countries, and (3) notification of registry of the sys-
tem in the International Frequency Register."'" The
plan has been characterized as a posteriori approach call-
ing for case-by-case resolution of conflicts or interference
by relying on a notice and recordation system. 165 Upon
notification of a proposed system under step (1), the IFRB
examines the notice and issue findings with regard to con-
formity with regulations and also with respect to the pos-
sibility for harmful interference with existing systems.' 66
Generally, the conflict will be resolved in favor of the first
user (so long as he also was the first to register). How-
ever, a WARC resolution provides that first registration
62 The U.S. position is that "emphasis should be on constructing a planning
approach that gives each nation the access it desires at the time it is ready to
implement a system." Anthony M. Rutkowski, The World Administrative Radio Con-
ference on Use of the Geostationary-Satellite Orbit: Airing the Views of U.S. Regulators and
Users, 24 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 51, 59 (1985). In fact, no state has ever been
denied access to the orbit. Doyle, supra note 142, at 7; see infra notes 170-175 and
accompanying text (discussing the problem of equitable access).
163 Bourely, supra note 83, at 149 (citing Final Acts of the World Administrative
Radio Conference for Space Telecommunications, Resolution Spa 2-1 (Geneva,
1971)).
- Doyle, supra note 142, at 5.
165 OTA WARC Report, supra note 137, at 71.
- Wiessner, supra note 90, at 229.
1993] 1077
1078 JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE
does not create a permanent priority and should not
cause an obstacle to the establishment of other space
systems. 6 7
In practice, no nation has been denied access to the or-
bit; the effect of the coordination process was generally to
wring concessions from the later user.' 68 Difficulties
arose from inconsistent use of interference standards and
from the bilateral nature of the coordination process,
which often did not adequately reflect the interests of af-
fected third parties. 69 The Geneva WARC of 1971 first
emphasized that space communications were a 'finite nat-
ural resource' and that it was necessary to share the re-
source between countries. 70  During the 1970s,
developing nations were disturbed by the results of the
coordinating procedure' 17 and argued that a planning
process based on first-come, first-served was inconsistent
with the limited nature of the geostationary resource and
the promise of access on an equitable basis. 172 At the
1979 WARC, it was resolved to convene a WARC to guar-
antee in practice equitable access for all countries. 173 At
the 1982 ITU Conference, the developing nations were
able to modify the notion of equity in the ITU Conven-
tions to take account for the special needs of developing
nations. 74 This seeming gain on the part of the develop-
ing nations must be balanced against the provision in the
'67 Doyle, supra note 142, at 6 (citing Resolution 2 of the 1979 WARC).
- Id. at 7 (noting registration difficulties encountered by India for Intelsat and
by Indonesia for Palapa in the mid-1970s). India was required to shift its pre-
ferred orbital position by five degrees, restrict the satellites power which resulted
in increased costs for the Earth station and to restrict television operations. Id. at
8.
169 Id. at 7.
170 Bourely, supra note 83, at 149.
171 See Doyle, supra note 142, at 7-8 (discussing the Indian coordination of Insat
with the U.S.S.R).
172 See Wiessner, supra note 90, at 231 (discussing movement by developing
states following the 1973 Conference rewriting ITU Convention).
173 Doyle, supra note 142, at 10.
'74 See Milton L. Smith, Space WARC 1985: The Quest for Equitable Access, 3 B.U.
INT'L LJ. 229, 238 (1985) (providing detailed analysis of the 1973 ITU Conven-
tion with reference to 'equity' and 'use').
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same Convention that use of the geostationary orbit re-
source must be made "efficiently and economically."'' 75
In 1983 two WARCs were planned (in 1985 and in
1987) to work out a plan for allocation that incorporated
the resolutions of previous Conferences, including those
with respect to equity. 76 The developed nations and the
developing nations had opposing views as to the nature of
the plan to be adopted. The developed nations preferred
the flexibility of the old process based on case-by-case co-
ordination and first-come, first-served priority.177 They
also favored resolution of conflicts by the conflicting par-
ties focusing on technical issues to avoid protracted polit-
ical posturing. 78 The United States FCC emphasized that
any new or modified arrangements fashioned by the
Space WARC must: (1) support the U.S. telecommunica-
tions requirements; (2) be compatible with pro-competi-
tive deregulatory policies; (3) encourage efficient use of
the orbit/spectrum resource; and (4) not be unnecessarily
burdensome or inflexible in allowing innovative services
to be introduced. 79 On the other hand, the developing
nations favored a rigid a priori plan that would guarantee
access in the future. 80 The developed nations, while op-
timistic that all nations may be accommodated in the or-
bit, feared that the a priori planning approach would
promote rigid technical specifications and remove incen-
tives for technical innovation. The result of such a plan
could be an artificial scarcity in orbit positions and ineffi-
cient and inequitable use of the resource in general.''
175 Id. at 241 (citing Article 33 of the 1982 ITU Convention).
176 Histories of this period and analyses of the 1985 WARC abound. See, e.g.,
Doyle, supra note 127; Milton L. Smith, Space Law/Space WARC: An Analysis of the
Space Law Issues Raised at the 1985 ITU World Administrative Radio Conference on the
Geostationary Orbit, 8 Hous. J. Irr'L L. 227 (1986); Finch, supra note 147; Smith,
supra note 174; Ronald F. Stowe, The Legal and Political Considerations of the 1985
World Administrative Radio Conference, 11 J. SPACE L. 61 (1983); Wiessner, supra note
89.
'7 OTA WARC Report, supra note 137, at 71.
178 Rutkowski, supra note 162, at 65-66.
179 Id. at 58.
10 OTA WARC Report, supra note 137, at 71.
18, See Rutkowski, supra note 162, at 58.
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The development of a new plan was completed in
1988.182 The view of the developed nations, subject to
confirmation in practice, appears to have largely pre-
vailed. The plan adopted respects past allocations while
providing flexibility for future allocations.'83 The devel-
oping countries, however, obtained assurances of equita-
ble access. 84
The new plan calls for more detailed notification of pro-
posed systems to the ITU and more carefully outlines the
nature of harmful interferences. The plan still relies on
coordination to harmonize the various users. In con-
verting a national allotment into an actual assignment, co-
ordination and cooperation with existing users is
required. A means 'must' be found to make the assign-
ment, but equitable consideration must also be given to
the respective stages of development of the systems. Ad-
ditionally, the state (or international organization) whose
allotment is being converted into an assignment must as-
sist in the resolution of incompatibilities. The party re-
sponsible for the existing system is required to take all
"technically and operationally possible measures to re-
move incompatibilities to accommodate the new en-
"Equity is intrinsically an abstract concept that can only be achieved
on a case-by-case basis.... [Furthermore,] a planning approach that
protects hypothetical systems in the future at the expense of real sys-
tems in the present is not equitable. Equally inequitable would be a
planning approach that artificially limits the number of accesses to
the orbit to a figure below that which would be feasible in the future
when the demand for more intensive use arises."
Id. See also supra notes 40-42 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship
between equity and efficiency).
182 FINAL AcTs OF THE SECOND SESSION OF THE WORLD ADMINISTRATIVE RADIO
CONFERENCE ON THE USE OF GEOSTATIONARY-SATELLITE ORBIT AND THE PLANNING
OF SPACE SERVICES UTILIZING IT (ORB-88) (Geneva, 1988) [hereinafter FINAL
ACTS] (entered into force March 16, 1990).
18- Part A of the plan contains national allotments and Part B contains the ex-
isting network of systems. An allotment consists of a nominal orbital position, a
bandwidth, a service area for national coverage, generalized parameters as de-
scribed and a predetermined arc. Id. at Appendix 30B, at 39. Note that a national
allotment under Part A of the plan may still require coordination when the allot-
ment is converted to an assignment. Id. at Article L, Addendum, 44.
,84 FINAL ACTS, supra note 182, Preamble at I.
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trant."' 18 5 This may constitute a mere continuation of the
old system coupled with an agreement spelling out the re-
sponsibilities of the various parties in the negotiation.
The new plan, however, places a burden on the existing
operator, presumably a technically advanced nation, to
adapt his system somewhat to the new user. 8 6 The issue
of appropriation is dealt with by limiting the time period
of any allocation. The plan itself is anticipated to be valid
only until 1994.187 Assignments are only valid for the pe-
riod of operation claimed in the registration notification,
but extensions may sought and will be viewed favora-
bly.'18  This protects the vested interests of existing users
while avoiding the national appropriation issue. 8 9
The issue of disposition of allocations was not ad-
dressed directly. An exchange of feeder link channels,
however, was allowed between Germany and Switzerland
for a limited period.' 90 Presumably, any exchanges are
subject to the approval of the ITU.
C. ADEQUACY OF CURRENT OR DEVELOPING SPACE LAW
FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF CELESTIAL
RESOURCES
The existing treaty law, embodied primarily in the
Outer Space Treaty, is either too vague with regard to
property rights and uses of space resources or is self-con-
tradictory, as it is the proscription of national appropria-
tion. At best it can be regarded as embodying principles
guiding the development of space resources.' 9 ' Being
vague with regard to obligations and guarantees, it fails to
185 Id. at Article L, Addendum, 45.
186 Under the new system, the coordinator now has leverage, in the form of this
obligation, to force concessions from the existing user.
187 FINAL ACTS, supra note 182, art. 11, at 75.
188 Id.
189 The 1971 Conference specifically noted that use did not result in permanent
right. See supra text accompanying note 163.
-80 FINAL ACTS, supra note 182, Appendix 30A, Article 9A, paragraph 9, at 45.
191 See supra text accompanying notes 86-93.
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offer the necessary security required by potential users of
space resources that they will benefit by their investments.
The customary law, as developed through practice, is
not sufficiently developed to provide a predictable prop-
erty rights system.' 92 The customary law which may have
developed as a consequence of the general acquiescence
by states to the principles embodied in the Outer Space
Treaty is unsatisfactory for the same reason the Treaty it-
self is unsatisfactory. 93 It is vague and contradictory and
provides no predictive capability to potential users.
The practice at geostationary orbit provides some basis
for property law in outer space. The ITU has developed a
process for allocating resources in outer space that seems
to incorporate the first reasonable user concept. Once in
possession of an orbit location, the ITU procedure also
protects the user against harmful interference-giving the
user the power to exclude other users whose activities are
incompatible with his own use. 94 However, the posses-
sion power (right to use) is for a limited period of time
and subject to non-renewal by the ITU. 195 From this, and
from the limited allowance for exchanges under the
plan, 96 it is clear that the right to dispose remains with
the ITU.
With respect to the use of an orbital position, such reg-
ulation may be reasonable. The users investment is lim-
ited to the satellite itself, which has a limited useful
lifetime, and, while certain orbital positions are essential
for the effective utilization of the investment, no physical
change or improvement has been made in the position it-
self. In fact, for many users and uses, there is flexibility in
the actual position needed to use the system.' 97 The char-
acteristics of the geostationary orbit and its uses are not
analogous to the situation on celestial bodies. For exam-
192 See supra text accompanying note 119.
193 See supra text accompanying note 122.
- See supra text accompanying notes 166-85.
15 See supra text accompanying note 188.
' See supra text following note 182.
197 See discussion supra at note 152.
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pie, in creating a lunar base, the investment may not be
limited to the equipment sent to the Moon, but could in-
clude modifications to the site as well. Such modifications
may be as limited as site preparation for erection of facili-
ties or as extensive as building facilities into the landscape
(such as use of excavations as shelters) and the creation of
mines. In such situations the limited period of possession
and the lack of a power to dispose the property may se-
verely limit the value of any investment and thus limit the
incentive for investment.
III. A PROPROPOSED SYSTEM OF PROPERTY
RIGHTS IN SPACE
The powers necessary to constitute an efficient system
of property rights on Earth have been found, by deduc-
tion from first principles by political philosophers influen-
tial in the development of the Western institutions and
from history and practice in the courts, to be the power to
exclude, to use, and to dispose. 98 The resulting system is
also inherently equitable as it benefits society as a whole
and as it protects investments and expectations. This sys-
tem would remain equitable so long as the initial alloca-
tion of any new resource was, and is, not based on mere
usurpation of unclaimed property, but is based on invest-
ment in the property that adds to its value. 99
This system of property rights relies on the provision of
powers to the holder of the property. The source of the
power is ultimately in the state that enforces the liabilities
of parties corresponding to the powers of owners: the lia-
bility to exclusion, the liability for interference with use,
and the liability to respect contracts and to refrain from
hindering disposition. °0 This implies that sovereign
power is essential to any functioning system of property
'" See supra Part II.A.
' LoCKE, supra note 23, at 294. "[H]e, that incloses Land and has a greater
plenty of conveniencys of life from ten acres, than he could have from an hundred
left to Nature, may truly be said, to give ninety acres to Mankind." Id.
200 See supra Part I.A. 1.
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rights, and in the absence of a general sovereign body,
sovereignty is to be found in the nation-state.
How does the extension of man's activities into space
and onto the celestial bodies change the basic necessities
of an efficient and equitable property rights system? The
movement of activities into space affects only the place of
activities. The nature of those activities and of the actor
remain unchanged. The nature of efficiency and equity
are likewise unchanged, and the need for certain securi-
ties and guarantees to foster productive activity by man is
unchanged. The same property rights system that is most
beneficial on Earth will be most beneficial on the celestial
bodies.
The principles of the Outer Space Treaty do not neces-
sarily contradict these property concepts. It has already
been shown that the notion of property rights, including
the power to use and dispose, are not incompatible with
the general principles of the Outer Space Treaty.20 ' The
principle of access in space is also appropriate when prop-
erly interpreted. ° But, in regulating access, governing
bodies must make proper account for the use of various
portions of space and of the rights of the user to be free of
harmful interference. 3 Although the provision of Article
II against national appropriation contradicts these prop-
erty concepts, it is inconsistent with the notions of juris-
diction and ownership found elsewhere in the treaty.2 0 4
This provision should therefore be modified and replaced
with a concept of reasonable use or investment.20 5 Such a
provision should provide for initial allocation of un-
claimed property only upon productive use or investment.
This would allow for the security of national sovereignty
while preventing the non-productive reservation of vast
resources by non-users.20 6
201 See supra text at notes 109-18.
202 See supra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
203 See supra text at notes 112-15.
204 See supra text at notes 100-04.
205 See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
2 0 Once the investment is made, the property would remain in the possession
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IV. CONCLUSION
This Note sets forth the necessary attributes of an effi-
cient and equitable property system on Earth and has as-
serted that such a system should be extended into space
for the exploitation of celestial resources. Such a system
must provide for the allocation of rights, and the power to
exclude, use, and dispose of property interests. All of
these rights require the protection of sovereign power for
the provision of which the nation-state system has been
developed and is suited. The current and developing
space property law is not completely incompatible with
such a system, but is vague and inconsistent. Amendment
to that law by practice and by treaty explicitly approving
the system of rights is advisable. Such a course of action
would not be inconsistent with an Outer Space Treaty
amended to substitute a concept of reasonable use as a
basis for national appropriation for the no national appro-
priation provisions of Article II.
of the investor until disposed of or abandoned. Furthermore, the concept of use
would have to include provisions for reasonable growth.
The argument may be made that the abandonment of the no sovereignty in
space provision would project the conflicts between nation-states into space. This
assumes that conflicts are a result of nation-states. An argument to the contrary,
however, is that nation-states were historically a result of conflicts. Man sought to
develop the state to provide security in a world of conflict.
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